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DISPLACED TENANTS FIND SHELTER IN THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT:
WARD v. DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY,
786 F.2d 1526 (11th CIR. 1986)
Redevelopment projects designed to rid America's older cities of
slums and urban decay increasingly conflict with the rights of displaced
tenants.' Federal courts grant constitutional protection against the
"taking" of a leasehold in limited circumstances.2 A minority of courts
hold that a tenant-at-will, evicted from federally subsidized housing,
retains a substantive property interest until the lessor complies with
federal termination procedures.3 In Ward v. Downtown Development
1. See generally Comment, Urban Redevelopment and the Fiscal Crises of the Cen-
tral City, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 820, 822 (1978) (discussion of conflicting goals between
government sponsored redevelopment programs and low-income residents in target
area); Comment, Displacement of the Elderly: Policies and Strategies to Combat an Old
Problem, 16 GONZAGA L. REv. 723, 744 (1981) (efforts to revitalize cities often result in
displacing low-income owners and renters).
2. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. The fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution proscribes the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This comment focuses on the issue of a tenant's
substantive property interest under the fifth amendment. For a general discussion of
various aspects of the taking issue, see generally D.R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW
15-48 (1982).
In addition to judicial remedies, Congress passed the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976) to aid per-
sons displaced or those deprived of their real property by federal and federally assisted
programs. See Comment, Blight, Redevelopment and Relocation: A Recurring Pattern
Under the Uniform Relocation Act, 51 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 107, 126 (1982) (examines the
effect of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act on residents displaced by redevelop-
ment projects).
3. See, e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th Cir. 1973) (determining that
the National Housing Act and the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 create
a property right or entitlement to continue occupancy until cause to evict exists other
than expiration of a tenant's lease); Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 503 F.
Supp. 610 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 678 F.2d 919, 925 (1lth Cir. 1982) (affirming the
district court's finding that the statute establishing the Section 8 housing program is the
source of a legitimate expectation by an at-will tenant that a landlord will not evict him
or her without good cause); Swann v. Gastonia Housing Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1346
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Authority,4 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals extended protection
under the fifth amendment's taking clause5 to situations involving state
regulatory guidelines.6 The court held that a tenancy-at-will is a pro-
tected property interest entitling the tenant to compensation when a
state controlled redevelopment agency takes the tenant's interest with-
out adhering to requirements established in the agency's legislative
grant of authority.7
In Ward the Downtown Development Authority (DDA)8 purchased
apartments as part of a renewal project.9 On the DDA's instruction,
the apartment managers notified the residents, month-to-month ten-
ants-at-will,1° to vacate their apartments within twenty days.11 The
tenants complied with the eviction notice and later filed suit in federal
(4th Cir. 1982) (a tenant receiving Section 8 housing subsidies has a constitutionally
protected property interest in continued occupancy after the lease expires). See infra
notes 28-57 and accompanying text.
4. 786 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986).
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See supra note 2 and infra note 16.
6. 786 F.2d at 1526.
7. Id. at 1530.
8. Id. at 1527. The Florida legislature created the DDA to "plan, construct and
maintain public improvements and facilities within the central business district of Fort
Lauderdale, Florida." Id. 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-1056.
9. 786 F.2d at 1527.
10. Id. A tenancy-at-will is defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 1.6 (1977) as "one created to endure only so long as both the landlord and the tenant
desire." See C.J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 205 (3d ed. 1983). At com-
mon law, one party could end the tenancy-at-will by giving notice of termination to the
other. Id. State statutes, like the applicable Florida statute in Ward, modify this rule
by requiring termination notice equal to, or a fraction of, the rent-paying period. See,
e.g., J.R. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 56 (1962).
The tenants in Ward were paying monthly rent but had no lease. 786 F.2d at 1527.
Therefore, Florida law required the lessors to give fifteen days notification prior to ter-
minating their lessees' tenancies. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.03 (West Supp. 1985).
11. 786 F.2d at 1527. The DDA hired the former apartment owners as managing
agents. Their employment contracts required them to have every tenant sign a state-
ment saying that he or she had no other right than to possess the apartment in accord-
ance with any existing lease or oral agreement, and that said interest would expire on or
before October 30, 1985.
Tenants received notice to vacate on October 11, 1982. The DDA failed to hold a
public hearing or provide relocation assistance, requirements the DDA must meet prior
to approving a renewal project. See 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-1056 § 21.
The court stated that the agreement that the tenants signed only limited the right of
property possession to the lease terms. 786 F.2d at 1528. No contract created a prop-
erty interest binding the tenant to remain in possession of the apartment until October
30, 1985. Consequently, the court found no breach of contract. Id.
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court under the taking clause of the fifth amendment seeking compen-
sation for their lost property interests."2 The district court dismissed
the tenants' complaint, ruling that a tenant-at-will's expectation in con-
tinued occupancy of his or her apartment is too uncertain to be a com-
pensable property interest under the Constitution. 3 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a that a tenant-at-will has a
protectable property interest. 4 The court determined that the DDA
took this interest by terminating the tenancies without either con-
ducting a public hearing or providing the relocation assistance outlined
in the state statute authorizing the agency's operations. 15
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part that private property "shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation."' 6 Although the amendment proscribes takings of
property, it neither creates nor defines the substantive rights pro-
tected.17 Federal courts traditionally find a property interest when a
12. 786 F.2d at 1527. The tenants also alleged procedural due process violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (denial of relocation assistance without due process of law),
equal protection violations (charging that tenants similarly situated received the benefit
of relocation assistance under the DDA act), 786 F.2d at 1532, and pendent state law
claims for specific violations of the DDA act because of the agency's failure to follow
statutory guidelines prior to approving the renewal project. Id. at 1527.
13. Id. The absence of a compensable property interest also doomed the due pro-
cess claim. The district court dismissed the tenants' § 1983 claim, determining that
§ 1983 only provides a cause of action for violations of rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. Additionally, absent valid federal claims, the district court refused
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the tenants' state law claims. !I See infra notes
78-82 and accompanying text.
14. 786 F.2d at 1533.
15. Id. at 1530. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONSTr. amend. V. As early as 1897, the Supreme Court recognized that
the fifth amendment applies to the states through operation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Chicago, B & Q Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (prohibiting
a state from taking a person's property without due process of law). See also Morton
Grove Park Dist. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 78 III. 2d 353, 399 N.E.2d
1295 (1980) (the federal constitutional guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation applies to the states through the four-
teenth amendment); Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966),
aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968) (the fifth amendment requirement providing just
compensation for the taking of private property for public use applies to the states and
is incorporated into the due process meaning of the fourteenth amendment).
17. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests, of
course, are not created by the Constitution." The interests come from independent
sources [state laws] which secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to
those benefits). See e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1975) (a property interest
in employment may be created by ordinance or by an implied contract); Webb's
19881
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person has an expectation in the continued use or enjoyment of prop-
erty, arising from a legitimate claim of entitlement. 8 Often, the
sources of legitimacy for claims of entitlement are state and local
laws. 19
Historically, a tenant's expectation in the continued occupancy of a
leasehold depended upon the terms of any unexpired lease.20 Conse-
quently, the government must compensate a leaseholder when it takes
her land for public use prior to the lease's expiration." A tenant-at-
will, however, has no expectation of continued occupancy beyond the
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 153, 161 (1980) (the Constitution does
not create property interests, citing with approval Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). See generally
C.J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND UsE 3-14 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing what consti-
tutes "property").
18. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (for a property interest to exist, a person must have more
than an "abstract need or desire for it." He or she must have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the property interest). See also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at
161 (1980) (a mere unilateral expectation or abstract need is not a property interest
entitled to protection); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 265 (1970) (welfare recipients have
a claim of entitlement to benefits based on the statute defining eligibility requirements):
Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1982) (applicants for Section 8 housing
subsidies have a protectable claim of entitlement to benefits based on the limiting lan-
guage of the regulations for admissions and selections of the program); Geneva Towers
Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1974) (the ten-
ants' interest in avoiding rent increases lies in their statutorily created expectations that
they will continue to receive the benefits of low cost housing).
19. See Chavey v. City of Santa Fe Housing Auth., 606 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir.
1979) (rules, understandings, and independent sources such as state law, created prop-
erty interests); Richmond Elks Hall Assoc. v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d
1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977) (in determining what property rights exist and are, therefore,
subject to taking under the fifth amendment, federal courts look to state law); U.S. v.
Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1962) (to determine what constitutes a
"taking", the court should look to the law of the state where the property is located).
20. See A.W. Duckett & Co. v. U.S., 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924) (compensation re-
quired for the value of lessee's interest when the United States, although not taking the
fee, took control of piers where lessees operated an on-going business under a lease with
one and one-half years remaining). See also Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424
U.S. 295, 303 (1975) (government must compensate the holder of an unexpired lease-
hold interest in land for the value of the interest under the fifth amendment); Devines v.
Maier, 655 F.2d 138, rev'd on other grounds, 728 F.2d 876, 880 (1984) (leasehold inter-
ests are property interests protected by the fifth amendment).
21. Alamo, 424 U.S. at 303. See, e.g., U.S. v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
In Petty, the court determined that condemnation of all interests in a leasehold should
be treated like condemnation of all interests in a fee. Id. at 378. Consequently, tenants
with a written year-long lease containing a renewal option had compensable property
interests because the renewal option created an expectation of continued occupancy. Id.
at 380.
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statutorily guaranteed termination notice period;22 therefore, the gov-
ernment need not compensate the tenant-at-will under the fifth
amendment.23
Federal courts began to acknowledge situations in which a tenant-at-
will may retain a constitutionally protected interest despite receiving
statutorily sufficient notice of termination.24 In Joy v. Daniels25 a land-
lord receiving rent subsidies from the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA)26 followed South Carolina notice procedures to evict an at-will
tenant.27 The Fourth Circuit determined that, according to FHA reg-
ulations and custom, a property right or entitlement in continued occu-
pancy exists until a cause to evict arises from a condition other than
the lease's expiration.2" The federal government's participation in the
housing project, combined with the state's eviction procedures, led the
court to conclude that the landlord's actions were not "purely pri-
vate.",29 The court determined that sufficient state action existed to
invoke the fourteenth amendment's protections.3 0 Yet, the court noted
22. See Petty, 327 U.S. at 380. The Court held that the month-to-month tenants-at-
will displaced by the same condemnation proceeding lacked compensable property in-
terests. The Court stated that once the tenants received the requisite fifteen days notice,
they received no further entitlement. Id. at 380.
23. But see Pensacola Scrap Processors v. State Road Dept., 188 So. 2d 38, cert
denied, 192 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1966). Under the Florida Constitution, a tenant-at-will is a
property owner. Therefore, if the state condemns only part of the tenant's leasehold for
highway use, the tenant should receive the state's statutory compensation. Id. at 43.
The court, however, specifically limited its holding to this "partial taking" instance. Id.
at 43.
24. See infra notes 27, 40 and accompanying text.
25. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
26. Id. at 1238-1239. The FHA grants rent subsidies, paid directly to the landlord,
for low-income residents under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 12
U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1978).
27. 479 F.2d at 1238. The landlord gave the tenant thirty days notice to vacate her
apartment without giving her the reasons for her eviction. South Carolina law requires
that a landlord show cause to evict and that the landlord prove these reasons in court.
Id. at 1242. Prior to Joy, the Fourth Circuit held in Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d
1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970) that "public housing tenants are not actually ejected until
basic due process requisites are satisfied." Joy, 479 F.2d at 1242.
28. 479 F.2d at 1241.
29. Id. at 1239. The court stated that these actions had "so far insinuated [the
state] into a position of interdependence with the [landlord]" that the landlord's actions
were not so purely private as to fall outside the fourteenth amendment. Id.
30. Id. State action is necessary to invoke the fourteenth amendment protections
because the amendment does not inhibit the conduct of individuals acting in a purely
private capacity. 479 F.2d at 1238 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
1988]
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that because the South Carolina laws adequately protected the tenant's
due process rights by providing the same good-cause notice that the
FHA requires, the federal court had no reason to retain jurisdiction.31
The court explained that states traditionally regulate landlord-tenant
law and that like their federal counterparts, state judges must demand
compliance with the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.3"
In subsequent cases, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits33 interpreted
Joy v. Daniels34 to require that once a court holds the fourteenth
amendment applicable to the state action involved, it must determine
whether a constitutionally protected property interest exists, thus af-
fording relief to a tenant-at-will for deprivation of that interest.3" In
Swann v. Gastonia Housing Authority3 6 the Fourth Circuit applied the
Joy rationale where a Section 8 tenant's37 lease provided for termina-
tion on thirty days notice along with a provision for automatic annual
renewal unless the landlord follows the proper termination proce-
dures. 38 The court reasoned that before the fourteenth amendment ap-
166 (1970)). See also Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 922 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (there is no precise formula for determining whether conduct constitutes
solely private or state action); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961) (to constitute state action, the state, in any of its manifestations, must be signifi-
cantly involved in the private conduct); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
351 (1974) (the relevant inquiry is "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the state itself").
31. 479 F.2d at 1243. The South Carolina eviction laws require good cause notice
and failure to give such notice provides the tenant with the right to a trial by jury before
the landlord may evict the tenant.
32. 479 F.2d at 1243.
33. See Swann v. Gastonia Housing Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982); Jeffries v.
Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982). See infra notes 35-57
and accompanying text.
34. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
35. See Swann, 675 F.2d at 1345-1346, Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 922-925.
36. 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982).
37. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437
(1976). Section 8 of the Act provides rent subsidies to landlords of lower income fami-
lies, whose incomes are below fifty percent of the median family income in the area. Id.
at § 1437a(2). The federal government pays the subsidies through Public Housing Au-
thorities (PHAs) to private landlords participating in the Section 8 program. Id. at
§ 1437f(b).
38. 675 F.2d at 1344. Along with giving the tenant the thirty days notice, the land-
lord must send a copy of the notice to the housing agency for its approval in compliance
with federal regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982) and 24 C.F.R. part 882 (1987).
The regulations also provide that tenants may object to their eviction within twenty
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plies a Section 8 tenant must have an interest in continued occupancy
and the eviction procedure must constitute state action.39 The court
found that the lease's automatic renewal feature justified the tenant's
expectation of continued occupancy, which endured absent a good
cause notice for eviction.4 The Swann court found that the eviction
constituted state action to support the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment
claim.4 ' Following the reasoning in Joy,42 however, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the state court system sufficiently protected the tenant's
property rights.4 3
In a situation analogous to Swann,' the Eleventh Circuit retained
federal jurisdiction without considering the adequacy of a state court
remedy.45  In Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Finance Authority
(GRFA) 46 a private landlord attempted to evict tenants receiving fed-
eral subsidies under the existing Section 8 housing program adminis-
tered by a state agency47 for the Department of Housing and Urban
days of the notice. The Swanns requested the Georgia Housing Authority (GHA) to
disapprove the termination of their tenancy, and at the very least, hold a hearing before
making a decision. The GHA, after holding an informal conference, refused to change
its policy of allowing landlords to evict tenants with or without good cause. Id. at 1344.
39. 675 F.2d at 1345-46.
40. Id. at 1344-46. The court interpreted the federal housing statute to require that
the Georgia Housing Authority make a finding of good cause before approving the ter-
mination of the tenancy. No provision in the statute, however, required the agency to
hold a full-fledged hearing before eviction. Rather, the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment affords the tenant a right to a hearing before the GHA because with-
out receiving good cause notice, the statute assures the tenant he may remain in his
home. The due process clause protects this statutory entitlement. Id. at 1346. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding a recipient's entitlement to welfare
benefits is a constitutionally protected property interest).
41. The eviction constituted state action because the federal government helps sub-
sidize the tenancy, the landlord submits to federal regulation, and the local public hous-
ing authority determines if good cause exists to terminate a tenancy. Swann, 675 F.2d
at 1346.
42. See 479 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1973). See also supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text.
43. See 675 F.2d at 1347. The court found the South Carolina eviction statute in
Joy indistinguishable from the North Carolina statute in Swann. Consequently, the
state court would adequately protect the tenants' due process rights. Id. See supra
notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
44. See 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982).
45. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982).
46. Id.
47. Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 921. HUD delegated its administerial authority to the
Georgia Residential Finance Authority.
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
232 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:225
Development (HUD).4 8 The landlord gave the tenants a thirty-day
termination notice in compliance with the terms of their lease. 49 Nev-
ertheless, the court determined that the notice given to the tenants was
inadequate to terminate their interest given the connection between the
state and private action which triggered the fourteenth amendment's
prohibitions.5 °
The Jeffries court extended the reasoning in Joy5' and Swann,52 con-
cluding that the federal government's provision of subsidies gave Sec-
tion 8 tenants a constitutionally protected property interest.53 The
court ruled that a property interest arises where a landlord may with-
draw a government benefit only for cause.5 In this case, the federal
government's program vested the tenant with a property interest.55
Although the. private landlord gave the tenants sufficient termination
notice under their lease, the state agency's involvement coupled with
the federal regulations required good cause for termination of the ten-
ancy. 56 The court concluded that the federal statute creating the Sec-
tion 8 program was the primary source for the tenants' legitimate
48. Id. at 921, 922. Section 8 subdivides housing into four separate programs: Sec-
tion 8 New Construction, Section 8 Substantial Rehabilitation, Section 8 Moderate Re-
habilitation, and Section 8 Existing. Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) administers the existing Section 8 housing program. Id. See supra note
37.
49. Ard. at 925. The tenant's lease provided for termination on thirty days notice by
either party.
50. Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 923. The court here utilized the language of the Fourth
Circuit in Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1238 (4th Cir. 1973), concluding that the
statutory prescriptions of the Section 8 regulations established the responsibility for
lease termination and eviction with the state. Therefore, the private landlord could not
act without state approval to terminate the lease. Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 924.
51. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
52. 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982).
53. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 925-926 (11 th Cir,
1982). See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
54. Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 925. In Joy and Swann, the Fourth Circuit determined the
protected property interests at issue arose from the failure of a state agency to establish
good cause before evicting the tenants in accordance with federal regulations. See supra
text and accompanying note 43.
The Jeffries court, however, viewed the federal regulations as the primary source of
the tenants' property interest in continued occupancy of their apartments because they
had a legitimate expectation that they would not be evicted without good cause as the
Section 8 program provides. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1970). Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 925.
55. Id. at 925.
56. Id.
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expectation in continued occupancy, protected by the fourteenth
amendment from deprivation without due process of law.57 The court
failed to consider whether the at-will tenants, once deprived of their
property interests, could recover compensation under the fifth amend-
ment's taking clause. 8
In Joy,59 Swann,6° and Jeffries,6 1 the courts evaluated the existence
of constitutionally protected property interests only after they deter-
mined that sufficient state action existed.62 Soon after the Jeffries deci-
sion, the Fifth Circuit delivered a different interpretation of state action
in a situation involving a federal housing program.63 The court in
Miller v. Hartwood Apts., Ltd. 6' acknowledged that federal regulations
established the guidelines with which Section 8 lessors must comply.
65
Nevertheless, the court determined that landlords act as private owners
on a daily basis. 66 The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
57. Id.
58. See 678 F.2d 919. The court dealt solely with the tenants' property interest as it
related to the due process clause of the fifth amendment, as the tenants did not sue for
compensation under the taking clause. See U.S. CONsT. amend V. Courts determine,
however, whether a substantive property interest exists without considering the remedy
to protect that interest. See 678 F.2d 919, 925-926. The issue is whether the tenants
legitimately expected continued occupancy. The Jeffries court answered this question
affirmatively. Id.
59. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
60. 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982).
61. 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982).
62. See supra notes 29, 30, 35, 50 and accompanying text.
63. See Miller v. Hartwood Apts., Ltd., 689 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1982).
64. 689 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1982).
65. Id. at 1244.
66. Id. The court found that the private landlord's connection to the federal Sec-
tion 8 housing program was not a "sufficient nexus" to hold the federal government
responsible for the landlord's action. Id. at 1243. Nor did the court find any state
officials or state laws involved in the day-to-day operations of the apartments. Id. at
1243, 1244.
The Miller court based its state action analysis on the Supreme Court's decision in
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 689 F.2d at 1243. The decision in Blum fol-
lowed only two weeks after the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Jeffries v. Georgia Resi-
dential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 44-57 and
accompanying text. In Blum, Medicaid patients challenged a private nursing home's
decision regarding the patients' discharge or reduction in level of care. 457 U.S. at
1005-09. The Court found the nursing home's activities failed to constitute sufficient
state action to invoke fourteenth amendment protections. Id. Although a state agency
implemented the federal Medicaid program, the State is not responsible for the nursing
home's decisions at issue. Id. A professional makes these decisions according to a pa-
tient's medical condition. Id. The Blum Court stated that despite the federal statutory
1988]
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the claim,6 7 holding that the federal government had not denied the
tenants' constitutional rights.68 The Court stated that a different issue
may arise if government employees operate the apartments or if gov-
ernmental eviction procedures are in question.69
In Ward v. Downtown Development Authority7 ° the Eleventh Circuit
extended federal court protection under the taking clause to tenants-at-
will not receiving federal housing subsidies.7 In Ward, applying rea-
soning similar to the Jeffries72 rationale, the court concluded that ten-
ants-at-will possess a constitutionally protected property interest.73
The court initially recognized that, according to Florida law, a month-
to-month tenancy-at-will is a compensable property interest protected
requirement that states provide funding for skilled nursing services, the statute failed to
require the states to provide services or to make daily administrative decisions. Id. at
1011. Finding that the patients failed to establish "state action" in the nursing home's
decisions, the Supreme Court held that the patients also failed to prove a violation of
any rights secured by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1012.
67. 689 F.2d at 1244.
68. Id. at 1243. The court rejected the tenants' argument "that the federal govern-
ment, by and through Hartwood Apartments, acted to violate their constitutional
rights." Id. For this argument to succeed, the court must determine that the federal
government was "actually involved in the activity that causes the injury." Id.
See generally Payne, From the Courts, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 172, 173 (1983) (interpret-
ing Miller to imply that the government's general regulatory involvement in Section 8
programs was too minimal to support a fifth amendment claim under any
circumstances).
69. 689 F.2d at 1243. This statement by the court was unaccompanied by any fur-
ther explanation. Moreover, the court failed to distinguish other cases involving Section
8 tenants. See Id. at 1244.
See generally Payne, supra note 68, at 172-73, in which the author distinguishes
Miller from Jeffries on the basis of the portion of the Section 8 program involved. In
Miller the claim of public involvement arose under the "new construction" section,
while in Jeffries the "existing housing" portion was at issue. As the existing housing
program regulation required the landlord to give the tenant good cause notice prior to
eviction, the court determined the public agency had a substantive role in the landlord's
actions. The new construction portion of the Section 8 housing program contained no
such provision. The lease in Miller, however, limited evictions to "cause." This implies
that "had the tenants not defaulted in state eviction proceedings, it appears that they
could have challenged their evictions on the merits, achieving the same result in a differ-
ent forum than they sought by federal action."
70. 786 F.2d 1526 (1lth Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 1530.
72. See 678 F.2d 919 (1lth Cir. 1982). See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying
text.
73. 786 F.2d at 1529-30.
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by the state's constitution.7 4
Turning to the Development Authority's argument,75 the court
agreed that if the landlord had been private, the tenants could not re-
ceive compensation for any interest extending beyond the notice pe-
riod.76 Stating that the case was similar in all relevant aspects to
Jeffries,77 the court concluded that because the landlord was a state
agency, the tenants retained a protected property interest until the
DDA complied with all of the enabling act's requirements. 78 The
court held that the DDA's failure both to conduct a public hearing and
to provide relocation assistance to the displaced tenants vested the ten-
ants with a legitimate expectation in continued occupancy. 79 The
DDA deprived the tenants of this expectation when it forced the ten-
ants to vacate their apartments.80
74. Id. at 1529 (citing Pensacola Scrap Processors, Inc. v. State Road Department,
188 So. 2d 38, cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1966)). See supra note 23.
75. See Ward, 786 F.2d at 1529. The DDA argued that it provided the plaintiffs
with sufficient statutory notice to terminate their tenancies. According to Florida law, a
month-to-month tenant-at-will is entitled only to a fifteen-day notice of termination and
any compensable interest terminated at the end of the notice period. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 83.03 (West Supp. 1986).
76. 786 F.2d at 1529.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1520, 1530. Prior to approving a renewal project, the DDA must comply
with Section 21 of the DDA Act, 1969 Fla. Laws Ch. 69-1056. As stated by the Ward
court, Section 21 requires the DDA to:
1) [D]etermine by resolution that the area affected is a slum or blighted area;
2) [S]ubmit the renewal plan to the city planning board for review and recom-
mendations as to the conformity of the renewal project with the general plan for
development of the city;
3) [H]old a public hearing on the renewal project; and
4) [F]ind that "a feasible method exists for the location of families who will be
displaced from the renewal area in decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommoda-
tions within their means and without undue hardship to such families."
786 F.2d at 1529.
The DDA failed to hold a hearing or to determine whether a feasible relocation
method existed. Id. at 1529.
79. 786 F.2d at 1529-30. The court in Ward recognized that the existence of a
property interest in Jeffries resulted from the Housing Authority's ability to evict only
for cause, and not because its authority was conditional. The tenants in Ward retained
a protected property interest because the DDA could initiate a renewal project only
after compliance with § 21 of the DDA Act.
The tenants in Ward had a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued occupancy
because the DDA failed to comply with statutory authority. The court found this situa-
tion indistinguishable from Jeffries. Id. at 1530.
80. Id.
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Based on the determination that the tenants had a compensable
property interest protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the
court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
DDA violated any of the tenants' rights under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' Judge Clark also directed the district court
to determine whether the DDA's failure to provide the displaced ten-
ants relocation assistance deprived them of equal protection under the
law.12 Moreover, because the district court originally ruled that it
lacked jurisdiction in the absence of a federal question, the appellate
court suggested reconsideration of pendent jurisdiction over the ten-
ants' state law claims.83
Ward v. Downtown Development Authority is important for recogniz-
ing that a tenant-at-will possesses a compensable property interest.84
The decision is also significant for extending a federal forum to a tenant
to whom the state court system may deny adequate relief.85 The rea-
81. Id. at 1532. The district court based its dismissal on its determination that
§ 1983 provides a right of action only for violation of those rights secured by the United
States Constitution and not for a denial of state-created rights. Id. at 1531.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's conclusion. Id. at 1531. The court
stated that it could not dismiss a § 1983 action for a procedural due process violation
solely because the interest at stake is state-created. Id. See supra notes 17 and 18. The
court must inquire into whether state law invests the plaintiff with a legitimate claim of
entitlement protected by the due process clause. 786 F.2d at 1531.
The court's finding that a tenancy-at-will is a substantive property interest meant that
the state could not eliminate the tenants' entitlement to relocation assistance without
due process of law. The court concluded that if on remand the district court determines
that the tenants could relocate to "decent, safe, and sanitary accommodations within
their means," the court will deny monetary relief for relocation assistance because they
"suffered no real loss." Id. at 1532.
For further discussion of § 1983 litigation in modem courts, see Madsen and De
Meo, 42 U.S. C. Section 1983 as an Emerging Remedy Against Unconstitutional Local
Government Land Use Policies, 59 FLA. B.J., August 1985, at 77-81 (§ 1983 is an "effec-
tive tool" for property owners to defend their constitutional rights against local govern-
ment land use policies).
82. 786 F.2d at 1532. The district court failed to address the tenants' claim that the
DDA provided other tenants with relocation assistance while denying similar assistance
to the plaintiffs because the court found no protected property interest. See supra note
80. Judge Clark rejected the district court's analysis, stating: "It is fundamental that
the Constitution secures equal protection of the laws. That a complaint alleges arbi-
trary application of a State law does not render the cause any less Constitutional." 786
F.2d at 1532.
83. Id. at 1532, 1533. The tenants alleged specific violations of the DDA Act along
with the federal question claims.
84. Id. at 1530.
85. Id. But see Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Swann v. Gastonia
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soning the court used to reach its conclusion, however, warrants
criticism.
The court's reliance on Jeffries 6 to the exclusion of contrary author-
ity weakens the impact of Ward87 on future decisions. The courts in
both Ward and Jeffries determined that a state agency's failure to fol-
low statutorily prescribed guidelines creates a protected property inter-
est in an at-will tenancy."8 In Jeffries, unlike Ward, a federal statute
created the tenant's substantive interest and protected against a taking
without due process protections.8 9 The state statute in Ward vested
the tenants with their property interests, protected by the court under
both the due process clause and by the fifth amendment's just compen-
sation clause." In light of the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Joy91 and
Swann,92 the Ward court should have considered the adequacy of state
procedures to protect the tenant's rights to compensation. 93 If the
court in Jeffries retained jurisdiction because of the federal govern-
ment's participation in establishing eviction guidelines,94 then the
Ward court's sole reliance on Jeffries fails to adequately distinguish the
situation from those in Joy and Swann.95
Housing Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982); see also supra notes 31, 32, and 43 and
accompanying text. In both Joy and Swann, the Fourth Circuit determined that federal
housing statutes vested the tenants with a substantive property interest. Nevertheless,
both courts found that the juudicial systems in their respective states afforded the ten-
ants sufficient protection.
86. 678 F.2d 919. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
87. 786 F.2d 1526.
88. In Ward the court found that, because the DDA failed to follow the state's
prescribed guidelines prior to approving a renewal project, the tenants retained a com-
pensable property interest. Id. at 1530; see supra notes 7, 74-79 and accompanying text.
The Jeffries court determined that the GRFA's failure to follow Section 8 guidelines to
terminate the tenancies created the substantive interests. 678 F.2d at 925, see supra
notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
89. Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 925. See supra note 88.
90. Ward, 786 F.2d at 1529-1530. See supra note 88.
91. Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); see supra notes 29-32 and accom-
panying text.
92. Swann v. Gastonia Housing Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982); see supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
93. While recognizing that under Florida law, month-to-month tenancy-at-will is a
compensable property interest, the court in Ward made no inquiry into the sufficiency
of a state court remedy for the plaintiffs. 786 F.2d at 1528-1529. But see supra notes 31,
32, 44, 85 and accompanying text.
94. See 678 F.2d 919.
95. See supra notes 58, 93 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit in Ward, unlike the court in Jef-
fries"6 failed to conduct a state action test to determine the applicabil-
ity of the fourteenth amendment's protection for the tenants'
substantive property interest.97 Given the Fifth Circuit's narrow state
action analysis in Miller,9" the Ward court's interpretation of the
DDA's status as a governmental landlord creates uncertainty whether
another court will reach the same conclusion in an analogous
situation.
99
The holding in Ward"° exemplifies the continuing trend toward af-
fording greater constitutional protections and procedural safeguards to
displaced tenants. Unfortunately, the absence of a more thoroughly
supported rationale may cast doubt on its precedential value. For the
near future at least, courts may proceed on the assumption that land-
lord-tenant law remains within "the province of the states." 101
Jane E. Fedder
96. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982); see
supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
97. See Ward, 786 F.2d 1526.
98. See Miller v. Hartwood Apts., Ltd., 689 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1982); see supra
notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
99. Miller, 689 F.2d 1239. In Miller, the court concluded that "state action" did
not automatically exist where a federal Section 8 housing statute imposed guidelines on
private landlords. Id. at 1243. The Jeffries decision, conversely, found sufficient state
action existed to protect the tenants' substantive property interest. Jeffries, 678 F.2d at
922-925.
Ward fails to distinguish the two cases because the court did not conduct a state
action analysis. See Ward, 786 F.2d 1526. The court in Jeffries concluded that a sub-
stantive property interest existed only after finding sufficient state action to invoke the
fourteenth amendment's protections. Jeffries, 678 F.2d at 922-925. If the Jeffries court
had held similarly to the court in Miller, no substantive property interest protected in
the federal forum would exist for tenants-at-will. Consequently, Ward's sole reliance on
Jeffries to conclude that a tenancy-at-will is a compensable interest would have little
foundation.
100. Ward, 786 F.2d at 1530.
101. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1973).
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